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ARGUMENT
The parties appear to agree that it would be error for a court to deny relief merely
because a motion to set aside a default judgment fails to refer to a particular subsection of
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Br. Appellees at 7. For the reasons
discussed in our opening brief, such a hyper-technical approach would be profoundly
inconsistent with this Court's jurisprudence and sound judicial practice.

See Br.

Appellant at 14-17. The Judsons do not argue otherwise and indeed deny that failure to
cite subsection (4) was even a basis of the decision below. See Br. Appellees at 7
("Nowhere in the Court of Appeals opinion does it state that Wheeler waived its
jurisdictional challenge merely because it failed to specifically cite to subsection (4)
when it sought relief from the trial court.").
Instead, the Judsons' defense of the decision below turns on two arguments: (1)
that Wheeler never raised personal jurisdiction as a defense, and (2) that Wheeler failed
to raise a meritorious defense with sufficient clarity. Both arguments are manifestly
without merit. They turn on tenuous wordplay and a refusal to credit the plain language
in Wheeler's moving papers.
Relief from a default judgment is available under Rule 60(b) "if (1) the motion is
timely; (2) there is a basis for granting relief under one of the subsections of 60(b); and
(3) the movant has alleged a meritorious defense." Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, If
64, 150 P.3d 480, 504 (Utah 2006) (citing Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, 882
P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994); State Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053,
(Utah 1983) (plurality opinion)). Wheeler's motion satisfies these elements.
1

I.

Wheeler Clearly Raised Personal Jurisdiction as a Basis for Relief from the
Default Judgment Under Rule 60(b).
The Judsons repeatedly deny that Wheeler even raised personal jurisdiction as a

defense. See Br. Appellees at 7-9. With due respect, that is simply inaccurate. Indeed,
the Judsons themselves repeatedly quote statements from Wheeler's motion papers
demonstrating that it did exactly that.
1.

The Judsons argue that "Wheeler did not raise the issue of personal

jurisdiction before the trial court as a basis for relief" Br. Appellees at 9. Not so.
Wheeler's Rule 60(b) motion plainly stated that "personal jurisdiction is lacking in this
matter due to the lack of purposeful availment and significant contacts with the forum
state." (R. 32). Supporting that assertion was the affidavit of Wheeler's General Counsel
stating that "Defendant does not purposely avail itself [of] the benefits and laws of the
state of Utah." (R. 39). Thus, Wheeler expressly raised a personal jurisdiction defense.
That the trial court failed to address that proffered defense was reversible error, not
evidence that Wheeler raised no such objection at all.
2.

Taking another tack, the Judsons argue that Wheeler's Rule 60(b) motion

did not actually contest jurisdiction but rather announced its intent to do so later. Id. at 9
("Wheeler was not intending to contest jurisdiction with its motion. Rather, Wheeler
indicated it would be able to show, sometime in the fiiture, that jurisdictional issues
existed."). As support, the Judsons emphasize the statements that "'Wheeler will be able
to demonstrate that . . . any assertion of jurisdiction over [Wheeler] is highly
questionable.'" Id. (emphasis by the Judsons, quoting the decision below ("Op.") at 22

3).

But this is mere wordplay.

Grammatical tense does not affect the validity of

Wheeler's right to be relieved of a void judgment. Neither the language of Rule 60(b)
nor this Court's jurisprudence requires that the assertion of rights be expressed in the
present tense. And even if it did, Wheeler met that requirement by stating in its motion
that "personal jurisdiction is tacking in this matter." (R. 32, emphasis added). Further,
as discussed below, it is entirely appropriate to assert that one "will" (in the future)
establish the merits of a defense because all that is necessary to set aside a default
judgment is a proffer (an assertion) of a meritorious defense that will later be proven in
the course of litigation.
3.

The Judsons argue that the "Conclusion" of Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion

"did not request that the trial court dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction."
Br. Appellees at 8; see R. 32. The argument is misleading. True, Wheeler's motion did
not expressly request that the entire case be dismissed immediately for lack of personal
jurisdiction. It did not need to. Having plainly asserted that "personal jurisdiction is
lacking," nothing in Rule 60(b) or this Court's jurisprudence obligated Wheeler to
reiterate that defense in a different section of its motion in order to obtain relief. But
even if there were such an unstated requirement, Wheeler's motion satisfied it by
specifically stating in the concluding paragraph that it had "legitimate and valid legal
defenses, including misjoinder and lack of personal jurisdiction." (R. 32, emphasis
added). Moreover, under this Court's jurisprudence, the point of Wheeler's Rule 60(b)
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motion was to assert meritorious defenses as a basis for setting aside the default
judgment, not to seek a full-blown adjudication of the merits of those defenses.
4.

In a further twist, the Judsons add that "nowhere in Wheeler's motion does

it assert that the judgment rendered is void." Br. Appellees at 8 (emphasis added). But
no such assertion is necessary. A judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction is a
legal nullity not because a party says so but because, as a matter of law, the absence of
personal jurisdiction deprives the court of authority to bind the parties. See generally
Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 608 (1990) (describing the centuries-long history
behind the principle that "the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void"). The
Judsons cite no authority for the proposition that the word "void" must be used when
asserting a personal jurisdiction defense under Rule 60(b).
5.

The Judsons argue that "[n]owhere in Wheeler's proposed findings or order

[submitted following the trial court's hearing on Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion] is
jurisdiction referenced as a means for the trial court to find that the default judgment was
void due to lack of personal jurisdiction." Br. Appellees at 8. Not true. Wheeler's
proposed order stated that "Defendant has provided facts demonstrating that legal and
valid defenses exist; namely, lack of personal jurisdiction and misjoinder of parties."
(R. 91.)

In any event, Wheeler's proposed (and rejected) order is irrelevant to its

personal jurisdiction defense and this appeal. Wheeler asserted its personal jurisdiction
and misjoinder defenses by motion as provided by Rule 60(b), and it is the adequacy of
that motion and those defenses that are at issue here.

4

6.

The Judsons' attempt to transform Rule 60(b)(4) into a pleading trap

conflicts not only with Utah law but with federal precedents interpreting the analogous
Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597
F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir. 1979) (adjudicating a motion to set aside a default judgment for
lack of personal jurisdiction when the defendant "did not specify which subdivision of
60(b) he relied on"); Dennis Garberg & Assoc, v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767,
773 (10th Cir. 1997) ("where the district court does not have jurisdiction over the
defendant, the court must grant relief from a default judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)").
In short, Wheeler amply demonstrated in the motion and accompanying affidavits
that "there is a basis for granting relief under one of the subsections of 60(b)." Menzies,
150 P.3d at 504. Wheeler's proffered defense that "personal jurisdiction is lacking in this
matter" based on lack of minimum contacts (R. 32) obligated the trial court to set aside
the default judgment as potentially void. State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d
1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (labeling the absence of personal jurisdiction "fatal").
II.

Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion Met the Meritorious Defense Standard.
The Judsons argue that Wheeler's purportedly "ambiguous summary statements

did not raise to the level of a 'clear and specific proffer of a defense'" sufficient to meet
the meritorious defense standard. Br. Appellees at 11. They contend that "[i]f this Court
were to accept Wheeler's argument, all that would be required of a party seeking relief
from a judgment or order under Rule 60(b) would be that they simply allude to the fact
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that, or mention somewhere in their motion that, personal jurisdiction may be at issue."
Id. at 9.
The Judsons misunderstand the law. The requisite "clear and specific proffer" of a
meritorious defense does not require "clear and specific" proof establishing that the
defendant will ultimately prevail on the defense.

To satisfy the meritorious defense

standard, Wheeler had only to set forth a "proposed defense containing allegations, facts,
or claims that, if proven at trial, would preclude total or partial recovery." Lund v.
Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P.3d 277, 283 (Utah 2000) (emphasis added). It "need not
actually prove its proposed defenses." Id. (emphasis added). Wheeler made a clear and
specific proffer of a defense when it stated and argued in its Rule 60(b) Motion that
"personal jurisdiction is lacking in this matter" and that the Judsons had sued the wrong
party. (R. 31-32). Each proffered defense was sufficient because, if later proven, each
"would preclude total or partial recovery."
This Court's reasoning in Erickson and Lund makes clear that Wheeler's proffer of
a personal jurisdiction defense suffices as a meritorious defense for purposes of Rule
60(b). Because general allegations satisfy the meritorious defense standard for other
defenses, it follows a fortiori that nothing more can be required where a party seeks to set
aside a default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Indeed, this Court has

emphasized that constitutional concerns presented by the application of the meritorious
defense standard to a personal jurisdiction defense are avoided only because that standard
is easily met by the kind of general denials expressed by Wheeler in its Rule 60(b)
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Motion.

See Erickson at 1149 n.2 ("Because we hold that a general denial such as the

one offered in this case is sufficient to meet the meritorious defense requirement, it is
unnecessary to reach [the defendants'] claim that the requirement is unconstitutional.")
(emphasis added).
Even if the Judsons were correct that some actual proof supporting Wheeler's
personal jurisdiction were required (they are not), the motion still should have been
granted. The affidavit in support of Wheeler's Rule 60(b) Motion set forth a brief but
adequate factual basis for a personal jurisdiction challenge. (R. 39.) It established that
Wheeler "operates it business in Nevada" and "does not purposely avail itself [of] the
benefits and laws of the state of Utah." Id. The Judsons never challenged or rebutted this
jurisdictional evidence with contrary evidence of their own.
In any event, Wheeler adequately met the meritorious defense standard and it was
error for the trial court to deny relief under Rule 60(b).
III.

The Judsons Are Not Entitled to Attorneys Fees.
Lastly, the Judsons should not be awarded fees, regardless of the outcome. Their

reliance on Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998), is misplaced. There has
been no adjudication by this Court on the merits and a nonresident defendant like
Wheeler should not be required to pay attorneys fees as the price of challenging a deeply
unsound default judgment that is void for lack of personal jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The Judsons do not deny that default judgments are disfavored and that
"[gjenerally, courts should be liberal in granting relief against default judgments so that
7

cases may be tried on the merits." Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149. That is the guiding policy
that should inform this Court's analysis here, as it has throughout this Court's defaultjudgment jurisprudence.
The failure of the courts below to set aside the default judgment against Wheeler
was error. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision below and remand the
case to the district court with instructions to vacate the default judgment.
DATED this 28th day of June, 2010.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Alexander Dushki
R. Shawn Gunnarson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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